Does BRICS’ Expansion Pose a Serious Threat to the West?

At the 15th annual BRICS summit, the bloc agreed to admit six new members: Argentina, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Now, in 2024, all but Argentina have officially joined the bloc. Will these additions turn BRICS into the worthy adversary to the Western economic order it was intended to be, or will it only add to the internal issues that plague the group today?

[From Left to Right] President Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva (Brazil), President Xi Jinping (China), President Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa), Prime Minister Narendra Modi (India), and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (Russia) at the 15th BRICS Annual Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa via The New Indian Express 

The Current State of BRICS: Economic Juggernaut or Inconsequential ‘Book Club’? 

In 2009, representatives of Brazil, Russia, India, and China met at the first BRIC annual summit, with South Africa joining the bloc one year later. All of these nations had experienced some form of economic growth in recent history, especially China and India, which saw their average incomes since 1995 increase by tenfold and fourfold, respectively. Despite this sudden success, all of these nations felt excluded from the global economic system, which they claimed to be biased towards the West, the global North, and the United States dollar. BRICS, therefore, was created to be an alternative to Western economic conglomerates such as the G7. This led some to 

fear that BRICS would rival, and someday possibly overtake, the G7 in economic influence. But now, fifteen years later, has BRICS lived up to these expectations? 

The might of BRICS even before the new additions, has come primarily from its size, both in population and economic power. Pre-expansion BRICS member nations accounted for approximately 40% of the global population, far larger than the combined population of G7 member nations. Additionally, the combined economy of BRICS member nations was nearly 30% of the world’s GDP, which is about the same as that of the G7, although BRICS will almost certainly pass the G7 in the near future. In fact, BRICS has already surpassed the G7 when you consider Purchasing Power Parity GDP  With such a large share of the global population and GDP, it shouldn’t be a surprise that some see BRICS as a threat to the Western economic order.

Additionally, BRICS has always had a unifying grievance that brings these vastly different nations together. In domestic politics, groups that feel threatened have stronger lobbying campaigns than groups that are content with the status quo, and it’s no different on the international stage. All BRICS member nations have felt excluded from the world economy, which they see as unfairly dominated by Western countries and institutions. Additionally, each of these countries have felt that the dollar-dominated global economy leaves their economic performance dependent on changes to US interest rates, thus giving the US an unfair advantage in global economics. Thus, all BRICS member nations have had a common goal to create what they see as a more equal international financial system. 

So, do the economic might and unifying grievances of BRICS make it an economic powerhouse with the potential influence to rewrite the international financial system? Well, unfortunately for BRICS and its anti-western supporters, a lot is working against the organization, including major internal disputes among members, a lack of cooperation with existing international institutions, and an absence of concrete action towards their shared goal. Firstly, the existing conflicts between BRICS’s two largest members, China and India, hinder the organization’s ability to coordinate lasting efforts towards their stated goal. Primarily, the border disputes between the two largest members, China and India, prevent the cooperation needed in an organization like BRICS. Currently, China occupies and administers the territory of Aksai Chin, which is part of the greater Kashmir territory claimed by India. This disputed territory has caused several diplomatic crises between Beijing and Delhi, including, most recently, a series of military skirmishes in the Indian-administered Ladakh region between the months of May and June of 2020. While tensions have dissipated since then, China has continued to dump funds into a connectivity project with India’s arch-rival, Pakistan, while India has strengthened their relationship with the West, epitomized by their revival of the Quad alliance with the United States, Japan, and Australia in 2017. These feuds between the two most powerful BRICS members limit the organization’s ability to make significant progress towards their shared goals, reducing its status as an effective counterbalance to the Western economic order.

Additionally, the infrequency in which BRICS has interacted with existing international institutions takes away from its legitimacy when compared to the G7. All current G7 members are in relatively good standing with the UN, have been known to follow rules, and are large funders of the IMF. This gives the G7 credibility on the international stage, giving the organization a sense of legitimacy. BRICS members, on the other hand, have not been as cooperative with international institutions, and therefore lack this credibility. Most evidently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was seen as an egregious violation of international law, which deteriorated its relationship with many international institutions. Specifically, the UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and demanding that they reverse course. These poor relationships between Russia and established international institutions can cause neutral countries to see BRICS as less credible compared to its Western rivals, which limits the organization’s ability to pursue its main goals. 

Lastly, while a unifying frustration that brings BRICS members together has existed, the diverse array of regime types among them, as opposed to the universally democratic G7 and NATO, has led to disagreements within the organization as to its role on the international stage. NATO and the G7 consist of exclusively democracies, and not only do they benefit from democratic peace, but this universal form of governance typically means they have similar foreign policy goals. This makes cooperation and coordination on international issues easier, allowing swift responses to pressing matters and more decisive policies being made. On the other hand, BRICS is made up of both autocracies and democracies, leading to separate organizational goals among members. For instance, the democratic BRICS members and the autocratic BRICS members have differing opinions on the goals of the organization: western nations believe China and Russia have intended to use BRICS to spread anti-western sentiment and promote China’s Belt and Road Initiative. On the other hand India, Brazil, and South Africa have only sought to give developing countries a larger role in international economics and limit dependence on the US dollar. These fundamental differences in the purpose of the organization has led to intense gridlock, resulting in little progress being made toward the goals that all BRICS members have in common. 

The Newest BRICS Members: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 

At the most recent BRICS summit, the leaders of the current member states promised that the fundamental issues that currently limit the organization would be eliminated with the addition of six new members beginning in 2024: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates. Now that 2024 has arrived, all have officially joined the bloc besides Argentina, who pulled out of all agreements to join BRICS under President Javier Milei. The perceived benefits of these additions are obvious: A larger share of the global population and GDP, greater influence in international institutions, more global South nations in support of the cause, and greater currency power to rival the US dollar. However, scholars question whether these new members will be able to elevate the organization to meet BRICS’s goals, with some even noting that the new members may add on to the existing issues plaguing the organization today. Therefore, the rest of this article will be spent analyzing the potential problems brought to BRICS by these new members and whether they outweigh the perceived benefits.

Saudi Arabian troops are seen intervening in the Yemeni Civil War via. The Australian Institute of International Affairs. 

The Middle Eastern Hate Triangle: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE: The three incomingThe Australian Institute of International Affair BRICS members hailing from the Middle East have such a convoluted mess of territorial disputes, conflicting desires for regional hegemony, and contradictory alliance networks that cooperation between the three is almost impossible.

The most bitter rivalry is between Saudi Arabia and Iran, whose battle for dominance over the Arab world has lasted for decades. Fundamentally, the two countries disagree on religious grounds, with Iran being mostly Shi’a Muslim and Saudi Arabia being the dominant Sunni Muslim nation. However, the conflict began when the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the following wars saw Iran become a powerful theocratic regime, and a rival to Saudi Arabia’s regional hegemony. Since then, the two powers have been fighting for regional control through proxy wars in smaller Middle Eastern conflicts, especially after the Arab Spring uprisings beginning in 2011. Now, almost every conflict in the Middle East has a side being supported by Saudi Arabia and a side being supported by Iran. One example is the civil war in Yemen, in which the Shi’ite Houthi Rebels that were not-so secretly funded by Iran overthrew the Saudi-backed government, leading to a brutal proxy war that continues today. Another example is the ongoing conflict in Syria, in which Saudi-backed rebels were brutally suppressed by Bashar al-Assad, whose regime was largely funded by Iran. Other Middle Eastern conflicts, such as the ongoing crises in Palestine and Lebanon, are also parts of this greater chess match between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s allies are in their own proxy war with Iran’s allies. Saudi Arabia is a strong ally with the United States, Israel, and India, while Iran’s closest allies are Russia, Syria, and, to a lesser extent, China. 

While not as powerful as Saudi Arabia, the small but wealthy United Arab Emirates has its own dispute with Iran over three small islands in the Strait of Hormuz. These islands are administered by Iran, however they are also claimed by the Emirati government, who have expressed that they will not budge on the issue. In response, Iran conducted military drills on the island, an act which was surprisingly condemned by their ally and future BRICS partner, Russia. As a result, one would think that this would lead the UAE to be close allies with Saudi Arabia, especially considering that both nations are run by oil-rich Sunni Muslims. For the most part, this is true, however, economic and political disagreements between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi exist. Both nations are trying to outcompete the other for economic dominance in the region. The UAE criticized Saudi Arabia’s plan to extend cuts of production in OPEC following the plummeting of oil prices in 2020. In this plan, the UAE would be forced to absorb many of these production cuts, leading to potential millions lost in income. In addition, Saudi Arabia has expanded its airline industry by creating Riyadh Air, a state-owned luxury airline that would serve the Middle East. The UAE, who famously operate Emirates and Etihad Airlines, have enjoyed a monopoly in this sector of the airline industry, and haven’t been pleased with Saudi Arabia’s challenge to that, especially when considering the high travel demand to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj. Furthermore, the UAE, while initially supportive of Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen, has been less interested in contributing forces to the effort due to international criticism of the Saudi role in the war. This not only significantly reduces the military capacity of Saudi Arabia in the region, but also puts more international pressure on them to broker peace with the Houthis. Lastly, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have different relationships with the United States. The UAE has been quite cooperative with the United States, while Saudi Arabia, especially under the leadership of Mohammad Bin Salman, has begun to have strained relations with Washington. So, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE have similar foreign policy goals, they still maintain economic and political differences that have caused disputes between the Arabian powers. 

The addition of these three members adds to the pre-existing problem of internal conflict within the BRICS organization that hinders its ability to create meaningful policy. While the temporary truce between Saudi Arabia and Iran brokered by China earlier this year may make it appear like cooperation could be possible between the Middle Eastern giants, most scholars agree that there is still a long way to go before the two countries are willing to collaborate on economic policy. 

As a result, the underlying tensions between the Middle Eastern members will only add to the gridlock that currently plagues the organization, especially considering the strained relations between Saudi Arabia and Russia regarding Syria. With such a complex web of competing alliance networks, proxy conflicts, and territorial disputes associated with these three countries, it is hard to envision a scenario in which BRICS+ could cooperate in action regarding their shared goals, especially since the organization already has a problem with internal conflict. Such internal strife is simply not seen in the G7 and other Western organizations and therefore will limit BRICS’s ability to rival their counterparts. 

Debt and Civil Conflict: Ethiopia and Egypt 

The two African states that have joined BRICS have such large economic and political concerns within their borders that their hypothetical contributions to BRICS+ would be quite limited; possibly even dragging the organization down in terms of economic power and influence. 

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River has caused disputes with Egypt over water security via. Sky News. 

Egypt has had a long history of debt and resulting bailouts, meaning that its economy will likely not grow significantly in the near future. Egypt is the second largest debtor to the IMF, with their current amount owed being approximately $18 billion. Much of this debt originates from the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, which caused the Egyptian government to request a $22 billion loan from the IMF in 2016. Furthermore, in 2020, the Egyptian economy was hit particularly hard by the COVID-19 pandemic due to the slowing of trade flows through the Suez Canal, something Egypt is financially dependent on. The IMF issued an $8 billion loan to Egypt as a result. Interestingly, in 2022, Egypt’s supply of grain, which came primarily from Ukraine, drastically deteriorated due to the war initiated by Egypt’s future BRICS+ partner, Russia, resulting in an additional $3 billion loan from the IMF and a strain on relations between Cairo and Moscow. While tensions between the two have since dissipated, signified by the sale of arms from Egypt to Russia, Egypt’s dependence on Ukrainian agriculture has the potential to cause future disputes between the two BRICS+ members as Russia continues its war. This excessive borrowing combined with a 38% inflation rate would only be a burden in the way of the economic ambitions of BRICS. 

The final member to join BRICS+ in 2024, Ethiopia, has been plagued by violent conflict within its borders that would diminish its ability to meaningfully contribute to the organization. Beginning in 2020, the Ethiopian government has fought a civil war with the separatist region of Tigray, which has been one of the deadliest conflicts of the past few years. While Ethiopia and Tigray agreed to end the conflict in November of 2022, regional tensions still exist, with several other separatist groups within the country giving the government problems. In addition to these conflicts, Ethiopia has had complicated relations with future BRICS+ partner Egypt over control of the Nile River. In 2011, Ethiopia began construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Egypt claims is a threat to its water security due to its geographic position downstream on the Nile. While negotiation attempts have been made between Addis and Cairo, no tangible agreements have been made, with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi warning of potential severe conflict if Egypt’s water supply is affected by the dam. This is further made complicated by the fact that China has been a major funding source for the dam’s construction, meaning that their relationship with Egypt has been called into question. This major conflict that involves three future BRICS+ partners, when combined with Ethiopia and Egypt’s respective domestic issues, does not bode well for the future success of the organization.

The addition of Egypt and Ethiopia will bring further economic instability, internal conflict within and between member states, and strained economic relations with the rest of the world, which will only further plague BRICS+ with gridlock, illegitimacy, and an overall lack of definitive action toward their stated goals. 

Backing Out at the Last Minute: Javier Milei and Argentina 

At the BRICS summit last year, Argentina was among the group of nations scheduled to join the bloc at the beginning of 2024. However, the election of populist candidate Javier Milei meant that Argentina would not join the organization in 2024. While it may appear that BRICS+ dodged a $46 billion bullet, it simultaneously derails a key player in BRICS’s de-dollarization agenda, making Argentina’s last-minute plans bittersweet for the bloc.

Newly elected Argentine President Javier Milei’s face seen on a US 100 dollar bill via. France 24

Prior to the general election, then President Alberto Fernandez was intent on joining BRICS. However, BRICS wasn’t feeling the same way towards Argentina joining, due to the liabilities associated with the Argentine economy. Argentina is the largest debtor to the International Monetary Fund, with its total amount owed reaching $46 billion this year. In 2018, Argentina went to the IMF requesting a $50 billion bailout, which became the largest rescue in the history of the IMF. Even with this gargantuan loan, the Argentine economy collapsed again in 2021 due to irresponsible government spending, causing Buenos Aires to request a subsequent $44 billion loan from the IMF. As of this year, the Argentine economy is currently facing 100% inflation and 97% interest rates, meaning that recovery may very well be impossible. Moreover, Argentina’s constant back-and-forth with the IMF has caused relations with the largest IMF funders, like the US, the EU, and Japan, to deteriorate. Despite this, during the 2023 BRICS summit, it was announced that Argentina would be let into the organization, with much of the lobbying done by Brazilian president Lula da Silva, who wanted a South American ally in the bloc. 

However, Argentine discontent with the aforementioned debt crisis led to the election of far-right candidate Javier Milei in November of 2023. A self described ‘anarcho-capitalist,’ Milei promised to eliminate Argentina’s debt by drastically reducing government spending, cutting ties with left-wing countries, and embracing the West as well as the US dollar. Included in these campaign promises was a vow to back out of Argentina’s agreement to join BRICS. Milei has blasted both China and Brazil for their left-wing economic policies, instead wanting to expand economic relations with the United States, Israel, and the West. During his campaign, Milei strongly advocated for the adoption of the US dollar as Argentina’s national currency. While this plan, seen as radical by many, has been put aside for the time being, Milei is still interested in integrating the Argentine economy with the West. This culminated in Milei fulfilling his campaign promise and backing out of the agreement to join BRICS on December 29th, 2023. 

On the surface, it may seem as if BRICS should be breathing a sigh of relief as a result of Argentina’s decision. With all of the debt owed to the IMF, the weak currency, and the political instability, why would any organization with ambitions as large as theirs be interested in adding Argentina to the mix. However, Argentina’s exit may be detrimental to the future of the organization. Prior to the election of Milei, the Chinese Yuan was being used frequently in Argentina to purchase Chinese imports and pay off IMF debts. This was seen as a huge victory for global de-dollarization efforts and the BRICS organization. However, Milei’s election means that China will lose a key Yuan trader to the US dollar, which is a major blow to BRICS’s goal of global de-dollarization. Additionally, if Milei’s policies of dollarization are successful in reducing debt and inflation in Argentina, it may cause other countries with similar economic struggles to continue adopting dollarization policies. Milei was inspired by Zimbabwe’s adoption of the US dollar in 2009, which lowered the country’s monthly inflation rate from 433% to 2.5% in two years. If Argentina sees similar success with their dollarization policies, other countries with hyperinflation may see the US dollar as the solution, which would be detrimental to the global de-dollarization efforts led by BRICS. Overall, while there are certainly benefits to an Argentina-less BRICS, the potential ramifications of Milei’s dollarization policies could be damaging to the organization’s goals.

Conclusion: Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Wildfire 

The addition of these new members to the BRICS organization not only doesn’t fix any of their current problems, but it makes these pre-existing issues worse as well as creates new problems to further hinder the success of the organization. What these new members bring to BRICS is greater amounts of conflict within member states, among member states, strained relations with legitimate international institutions, and economic instability. These issues far outweigh any perceived benefits these countries will bring to the organization, meaning that BRICS expansion does not pose any serious threat to the Western economic order. 

What was already a convoluted map of disagreements among BRICS member states becomes exponentially worse with the addition of these new member states. While China claims to have cooled tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia/UAE, proxy conflicts between the two still exist throughout the Middle East, with no sign of stopping now. The countries are currently at odds over the Israel-Hamas conflict that broke out in October, as Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to support Israel while Iran is actively funding Hamas. Additionally, previously mentioned conflicts between Ethiopia and Egypt  will cause BRICS+ to be extremely susceptible to gridlock, meaning that nothing will get done regarding their economic goals. 

As previously mentioned, the G7 and other Western economic institutions gain legitimacy through positive interactions with international institutions. The new members of BRICS, on the other hand, have strained relations with these institutions, and therefore make the already questionably legitimate economic organization even less so. While all G7 members are regularly compliant and large funders of the IMF, Egypt’s poor relationship with the fund brings into question the credibility of these nations and therefore may lead to similar questions about BRICS. In addition, Iran’s lack of compliance with the UN, especially in their refusal to reveal their nuclear capabilities, brings further these questions of credibility. Moreover, the countries of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Ethiopia have all recently been accused of international crimes regarding war practices, which brings them all into conflict with legitimate international peacekeeping institutions like R2P and the ICJ. Overall, the seemingly hostile interactions that many of these nations have with legitimate international institutions bring further suspicion about the credibility and legitimacy of BRICS. 

Additionally, the new members of the organization are a mix of democracies and autocracies, meaning that their addition to BRICS won’t provide a greater sense of unity like the G7 or other Western counterparts. While Egypt and Ethiopia are democracies in theory, Iran is an autocracy and Saudi Arabia is a monarchy. Clearly, with such differences in how these countries choose to govern, they will not see the same cooperative success as other organizations that are all democracies. 

With all of these problems, why would China and the other current BRICS members want to add these countries if they so obviously hinder the organization? As outlined earlier, BRICS in its current form hasn’t accomplished much regarding their stated goals, and it doesn’t seem like they ever will apart from drastic changes in the organization’s makeup. Therefore, the current members are likely adding these six countries – and all of the problems associated with them – as a last-ditch effort to assume the role of the western counterbalance they intended the organization to be. This would explain why three of the five new members are Middle Eastern oil giants, as greater control over that industry could give the organization more economic power. So, while the addition of these countries has gigantic risks, BRICS may be willing to take these on with the hopes that their positives outweigh those negatives.

Overall, the problems that currently hinder BRICS are exacerbated by the addition of these new members, meaning that the organization will not be a significant balance to the Western economic order anytime in the near future. While these new members have benefits associated with them, there simply aren’t enough to significantly change the economic influence of BRICS. It seems like only drastic reform and unprecedented peace deals would have to be created for BRICS to serve its true purpose. While only time will tell what the true effects of this expansion will have on the international economic system, it would not be surprising if it is looked back on as a desperate attempt to counter the Western-dominated economy.

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